but also of intellectual, aesthetic, and moral considerations. The decision is a judgment accompanied by an emotion and appetition which acquires sufficient intensity and duration to occupy consciousness almost exclusively, and consequently to produce the correlative movements. The important point is to understand how the judgment influences desire, and through it, action. F.'s answer is that, if the judgment is a practical one, we find the representations and reactions connected by a bond analogous to that which unites the primitive sensations and reactions, with a difference only in complexity: if the judgment be theoretical, the reaction still exists as an internal sketch of certain acts and movements. We may conclude that it is only necessary to conceive of a determinism much more complex, and at the same time much more flexible, than that of the Associationist school which divides the mind into ideas or separate states, in order to combine them like the stones in a mosaic. It is necessary also to take account of the reaction exercised upon determinism by the notion of liberty under its diverse forms, and to seek in a comprehensive determinism the only possible or desirable liberty.
Our knowledge of dreams is still unsatisfactory, owing to difficulties of observation; in other words, of recollection. Even did the observer attempt a chronologic register of his dreams, it would necessarily contain lacunæ. In anæsthesia, apoplexy, and intoxication, the most acute sensations are similarly forgotten after the return to the normal state. The question of dreams depends, then, on the trustworthiness of the memory. The purely psychological questions raised by the phenomena of sense, external or internal, in dreams are excluded from this discussion. Dreams illustrate especially the large part played by sensation in the psychological determinism; an individual deprived of his physical senses could not be supposed to dream. Dreams are incompatible with the purely vegetative existence; the nerve-cell is postulated; a dream is a series of reflexes. Dreams can be classified, then, according to the kinds of sensations involved, as external, internal, mixed. The majority of our sensations are of sight; they agree with the condition of the eye, being sometimes impaired by myopia, color-blindness, and the like. In dreams, however, every one sees with perfect distinctness and without fatigue. The illumination of dream pictures is usually moderate, the scene distinct. When crowds or groups of human figures appear, they seem distinct at the time, but leave no definite impression. Objects seem real, but are less in relief than men and animals. These
