to indefinite, pre-existing matter. In a similar way, the mathematical idea controlled Cartesian thought, except that there the Infinite is made positive and determination is considered to be negative. The Greek whole is determinate, finite; the modern whole is infinite being. The ethical significance of these views appears clearly in the contrast between the Greek high-minded man, confident of realizing his ideal, and the modern man, humble because conscious of an infinite ideal. The Greek and modern conceptions of the Infinite are alike in one respect. Both are essentially spatial. Kantian ethics clearly shows the influence of this point of view. But the geometrical Infinite is Hegel's 'bad infinite.' Descartes, in his proof of the existence of God, implies a truer view, the teleological conception. Consciousness of mathematical limitation does not imply a positive idea of infinite space. In fact, we cannot have such an idea. But consciousness of qualitative imperfection does imply some standard; and the more definite our consciousness of defect, the more definite must be our consciousness of a standard of perfection. The confusion between the mathematical and teleological conceptions has evidently arisen from a confusion between quantitative and qualitative differences. The idea of the mathematical infinite has probably arisen in connection with space and time, which we are prone to consider as endless. But, by a slight modification of Kant's positive solution of the problem, we may regard space and time, so far as they have actual existence, as limited. This implies that they are closed circles. This point of view gives a new meaning to infinity, and is what the author regards as Hegel's view. A closed circle is infinite though its content is limited. The true infinity, in short, is a completely determined finite. It is concrete and intelligible, giving meaning to existence rather than including the whole of existence. This view of the Perfect is ethically significant, in that it leads back from empty mysticism to admiration for that which is completely known and understood. The author regards Professor Royce's Infinite as another case of the 'bad infinite.' The indefinite going on is possible only for one leaving out some of the essential conditions of the problem. We reach the idea of God through the sense of our own perfection, because we are aware of our own freedom and infinity. Every time I love or know anything, I am aware that I appropriate the world of my experience as the counterpart of myself. The idea of God proves its reality by the fact that it continues to present itself to us as the only possible key to our experience; it must be valid because it is vital.
By interpreting the significance of dream-phenomena for philosophy, the author attempts to reconcile realism and idealism. Absolute idealism avoids the dangers of realism by maintaining that all reality is experience, and of subjective idealism by asserting that this experience is not of the in-
