ness, or in regard to the relation of mind and matter. The view of consciousness as a continuum explains the mutual isolation of individual consciousness, since two continua of the same kind cannot be parts of each other. It is the distinctive character of conscious continua that the different objects related become representative of each other. This relation renders knowledge possible, and all science deals solely with the systematization of this representative value. Since knowledge depends on the relations of things in consciousness, and not upon the relation of things to consciousness, knowledge is realistic ; consciousness may be a conditio sine qua non of knowledge, but it is not its determining factor. Though the author agrees essentially with Professor James's view of consciousness, he dissents from the view which makes consciousness a function within experience that differentiates experience into subjective and objective. This distinction throws no light on the nature of consciousness.
In this paper, the writer gives a brief summary of his philosophy. Coming to the study of logic only after an extended scientific and practical training, he finds three reasons for distrusting the Instrument of Thought: (1) The syllogism depends on classification; we mark off A and B from not-A and not-B by fixed circles. But this procedure is invalid, for in reality each individual is unique, and classes merge into one another by insensible gradations. (2) We constantly tend to treat negative terms, especially such vague ones as Infinite, Absolute, Omniscient, and the like, as if they represented positive classes. (3) The various terms in our reasoning lie at different levels, in different planes, and much error and confusion results from ignoring this fact. A flagrant case would be to speak of cutting an atom with a knife. The free-will controversy seems to be a case in point; at the level of common experience the will is free, but on closer analysis it is seen to be strictly determined. Our standards of truth, beauty, and goodness are subjective; but this does not prevent the association under a common name of those who hold the same standard in common. In some respects, these views may bear a certain resemblance to 'pragmatism.'
On the assumption that our knowledge of reality is valid, how are relations to be construed? The change produced in the nature of external objects by the discovery of new relations, and the modification of external relations by the thought process, show relations to be inherent in the nature of reality. That our thought is unable to give a complete account of external relations does not prove that thought is invalid, but indicates merely that experience is more complex than our thinking. Relations are
