volume for use as a text-book. The general clearness and vigor of the style have already been mentioned. But the author is not merely an agreeable writer: he is a man of strong moral convictions, which he is not afraid to express, even when they are likely to offend. By thus throwing his whole personality into his writing, he has produced a book that is almost sure to interest those who are beginning the study of ethics. This very moral earnestness, however, has sometimes led him into exhortation or invective, when cool, scientific argumentation would have been quite as much to the purpose. It is particularly unfortunate that he has not seen fit to explain somewhat more carefully the theories which he so freely criticises. The most serious pedagogical defect of the book, however, is that the author's own position is so difficult to make out. But the best test of the value of a text-book as such is actual use in class; and, considering Professor Bowne's wide popularity throughout the country, there is no doubt that the experiment will be thoroughly tried.
This book should be both interesting and suggestive to all who are engaged in the education of the young, since it essays a practicable solution of the problem of non-sectarian school instruction in the fundamental principles of morality, and seeks at the same time to bring the principles that are presented within the powers of apprehension of the young at every stage of progress. It offers therefore a graduated series of lessons adapted to various ages up to fourteen.
Conceiving ethics as the science of the limits within which man may innocently pursue his own ends, and taking for granted the idea of right and wrong as native to the human soul, the author proposes that the public school shall inculcate in youth "the common fund of moral truth held by all good men," by proper pedagogic methods, without dealing with the sanctions to it given by religion. The Ought is to be strongly impressed, but without the Why, since into the latter are wont to enter sectarian or philosophic differences of opinion. "Let philosophers differ," he says, "as to the ultimate motives of duty. Let them reduce the facts of conscience to any set of first principles. It is our part as instructors to interpret the facts of conscience, not to seek for them an ultimate explanation."
The classification of duties which the author proposes is based on the objects to which duty relates; viz., self-regarding duties, duties to
