promote happiness, and would not be practised by some except for a reward. If men desire only happiness, that is the basis of morality. The objection that pleasure ought not to be the ground of human action, even if it is, can only mean that another system would be better for mankind. But if a better system is possible, it is sanctioned by the principle of utility, and really is utilitarianism. But men do desire only happiness. Other apparent motives may be in the foreground; but happiness, although remote, is the determining factor. We shun insanity and illusion, however pleasant, because we regard it as a condition of humiliation and misery. The miser loves money, not for itself, but for the pleasure of security and power which it may give even when hoarded. It is for the sake of pleasant memories that we desire useless mementos. We often love business routine, because habitual actions not at first pleasant become in time relatively so. Some love disinterested virtue. This is accounted for by the pleasure of a commending conscience in such men always overpowering. Some are willing to admit that every desire fulfilled gives pleasure, but hold that the pleasure comes from the very fact of fulfilment and not from the object desired. This is untenable. It is not that we desire an insipid thing and rejoice in having got it, but we desire what is pleasant in itself. The rise of social morality is as follows: If a man desires pleasure alone, he will urge his fellows to act for his benefit. When interests clash, he who would suffer least will generally give way. Society would enforce abstinence from pleasures which cost others more than equivalent pain. In fine, acts would be classed as right and wrong according as they advanced public happiness and were not natural to all men. All desire happiness, but not necessarily the happiness of all. The object of morals is the object of society, not of individuals. Society will enforce the moral law upon some, others will obey for their own good. One's responsibility to morality depends, not upon one's self, but upon liability to punishment by society.
Popular opinion at present attaches much greater importance to practical beneficence than to charity based upon theory. While the emphasis of the practical is a hopeful sign of the times, is it not a mistake to oppose practice to theory, or to suppose men will act right without understanding the rational principles that should regulate conduct? Philanthropy must make for human progress, and this is the fulfilment of the moral law. Hence philanthropy must contribute to morality. Let us, then, consider the effects of practical beneficence
