Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/180

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166
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

another to say that we, through reflection on experience, cannot come to a consciousness of these forms. Kant never clearly distinguished between these very different positions. Hence his contention that a theory of the a priori must itself be a priori, and so, absolutely complete and necessary.[1]

The critical problem then is to be solved precisely like any other problem. Whatever his intention, Kant solved it by means of hypotheses, which, as they originated in reflection, must also be brought to the test of reflection for their verification. There are a priori synthetic judgments; here are hypotheses to explain them. We have seen reasons to doubt the existence of such judgments. But we are not on that account altogether excused from an examination of the conditions Kant has found for them, since these, as we saw, are not only intended to explain but to some extent also to justify a priori knowledge. Neither, on the other hand, should any pretensions to infallibility of method or finality of results debar us from examining Kant's solution of the critical problem with the utmost freedom. But all this must be reserved for later articles.

Editor.

  1. Whether the Critique is metaphysical (a priori) or psychological (a posteriori) is a question that has given rise to a voluminous literature in Germany. It is to be solved, I think, by distinguishing between the intention of the author and the execution of his work. That was rationalistic, this empirical. By this distinction we can account not only for Kant's self-contradiction on this subject, but also for the discordant discussions to which it has given rise. Of older writers who have discussed this subject it will suffice to mention Fries, Schopenhauer, Beneke, and Herbart. For the later treatment of it, see, besides Kuno Fischer's Geschichte, Meyer's Kant's Psychologie (an exhaustive and judicial monograph); Cohen's Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung, 105 ff., 122 ff.; Riehl's Philos. Krit., 294-311; Windelband's Gesch. d. n. Philos., 52 ff.; Vaihinger's Commentar, 431-2 (with the references).