331) Feder: Rev. of U. Vol. IV. 1791. pp. 180-194. (F. examines only a few points, like the notions of "the agreeable," " pleasure," "genius," because he had already given the contents in:)
332) Feder: G. g. A. 1790. pp. 1137-47. Besides these, there are also a number of reviews of books on critical philosophy in Ph. B. as well as in G. g. A., among which the review of Schulze's "Prüfung der Kantischen Kritik" (G. g. A. 1791. I, pp. 201 et seq.) is the most important, for in it F. candidly acknowledges a mistake that occurred in his treatise "Ueber Raum und Causalität," and of which much had been made. It consisted in deducing the principle of contradiction from experience. That K.'s doctrines considerably modified F.'s views is evident from:
333) Feder: Grundsätze der Logik und Metaphysik. Small 8vo. Göttingen. 1794. Dieterich. pp. xxiv, 375. In 1803 F. transmitted to the Société Philotechnique de Paris, as a corresponding member of the same, a not altogether worthless treatise containing 32 folio pages:
334) Feder: Précis historique et critique de la philosophie de Kant et des effets, qu'elle a produits en Allemagne. Published in the Society's Mémoire de l'an XI, in part also in
335) J. G. H. Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze. (Ed. by his son.) Large 8vo. Leipzig. Schwickert. Hannover. Hahn. Darmstadt. Leske. 1825. pp. 352-360. (Contains occasional passages on K., esp. Ch. 9: History of the Author's Controversies regarding Kantian Philosophy, pp. 115-129.) In the Ph. B. and in his later writings, F.'s criticism of K. becomes very mild, because his eclectic nature had led him to gather together, from acknowledged authorities, the elements of his characterless philosophy. He also, most likely, dreaded a repetition of K.'s scathing attack in Prl. Besides, since he did not take a comprehensive survey of K.'s system, but, eclectic that he was, confined himself to particular statements, he believed that most of the latter had already been advanced by K.'s predecessors, many of them by himself. The great admiration and the intense antagonism which K. aroused are said to be due to the fact "that he often expresses his views too strongly," and exaggerates opinions that are in themselves correct. K.'s idealistic assertions are especially objectionable to F., who characterizes them as exaggerations that contradict common sense. His writings have no longer any philosophical significance, their value is purely historical. But this value is, as far as the history of Kantian philosophy is concerned, by no means small. Up to the close of the eighties, F. was a highly respected teacher and author of text-books (his text-books on theoretical and practical philosophy passed through eight and seven editions respectively). At the beginning of the nineties, the attendance at his lectures grew smaller and smaller, in 1791 the Ph. B. suspended for lack of support, F. himself relinquished his professorship at Göttingen and became Director of the Georgianum in Hannover.
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