Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/533

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519
METAPHYSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY.
[Vol. II.

of this view, namely, that other forms of existence are distinct from God, in any way slurred over; on the contrary, it is affirmed in various ways that each thing is in existence as truly individual as God himself. "The meanest thing that exists has a life of its own, absolutely unique and individual." It would therefore seem that, so far as existence is concerned, God is not the only being, but only one of a number of beings, each of which as truly exists as God. Then, God does not contain all existence within himself, but lacks that part of existence which belongs to other beings. He is, therefore, limited as to existence by the beings outside of him. This may not imply any limitation of his wisdom or love or goodness, but it certainly implies the limitation of his existence. But how can a Being of this sort be the principle of unity? The problem of metaphysic, on Mr. Seth's own showing, is to find a real existence, which shall serve to bind together the reality of the individual subject revealed in psychology, and the reality of the objective world guaranteed by epistemology; but the Reality actually certified by metaphysic is merely another Reality as exclusive as the two forms of reality which it is to bring into unity. It is a curious way of reducing mutually exclusive realities to unity of existence simply to add another Reality equally exclusive. Mr. Seth's metaphysic thus leaves us with an aggregate of individual existences, of which God is merely one among the rest. Even if we suppose God to be capable of contemplating all other existences besides his own, we shall have no real unity of existences; all beings will remain as absolutely separate and distinct as before. It would therefore seem that, if the problem of metaphysic is to be solved at all, we must affirm that there is no absolutely individual existence, as our author defines individuality. Mr. Seth shows a tendency to appeal to the popular conception of God as a transcendent Being: let me remind him that the popular consciousness has equal faith in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as present in the soul of all believers. In any case, I feel certain that, on Mr. Seth's theory, the problem of metaphysic must be abandoned as hopeless.