this very problem of mathematical knowledge. It is equally certain, for he himself so states, that up to the time he received Lambert's first letter he was occupied in an entirely different sphere of speculation, the method of philosophy, the metaphysical principles of morals, and the principles of natural (not mathematical) science. From these various facts we cannot but conclude that it is more than possible that the starting-point of the Transcendental Æsthetic was unconsciously given by Lambert. And if it is to Lambert that Kant owed the starting-point of his theory of sensibility, it is to Lambert that he owed the starting-point of his entire theoretical philosophy.
We have now completed our examination of the historical relation existing between Lambert and Kant, as well as of the relative worth of Lambert's contributions to philosophy considered with reference to those of his successor. It remains only to point out that the position of Lambert in the history of speculative thought is quite independent of the purely logical validity of his philosophic Weltanschauung. Whether or not his epistemology be more tenable than that of Kant, it failed utterly to break the metaphysical deadlock of the age. It was not the Organon, but the Critique of Pure Reason, that developed clearly that fundamental conception for which the philosophic consciousness of humanity was then waiting, that of truth subjective as separate and distinct from truth as applied to things-in-themselves. Nevertheless Lambert's work, considered of itself, without reference to its possible influence on Kant, is of not a little historical significance. For, even though shadowy and incomplete, it may, we think, justly be regarded as the premature objectification of critical tendencies not yet ripe for fruition, but which when fully matured, reached their final perfection in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
Columbia College,
October, 1892.
