And the end of labour is not an end in itself but subordinate to, conditioning and conditioned by, the other ends of society, because it forms part of the general well-being of a community and ministers thereto. Hence it is that in labour we have the seriousness which characterizes devotion to a lasting purpose; in play the delight and amusement in transitory ends. In labour the conditions of acting are laws which are imposed on individuals as obligations and duties, to which we can even assign an eternal significance; while in a game the conditions are rules, arbitrarily laid down and binding on none but those who choose to play. In labour as in morality there are no amateurs, and no professionals; but all are more or less unsuccessful strugglers towards a better life.
As regards the consequences of this view of labour: it follows from the conception of labour here put forward that it is impossible to separate the labour element in society from the general social life or from the general well-being of the community, and, on the other hand, it is equally impossible to separate the labourer from his task. Labour is, on the one hand, social service for the common good; on the other, it is the sphere of individual effort, responsibility, and, if possible, development. From the point of view of the social whole there is no difference in kind between the workman who builds houses, the capitalist who contracts for the work, the lawyer who draws up contracts, or those who make the law and see the contract carried out. For all these are forms of social service, all are ways of realizing the one end and the common good of all. The difference lies in the way the service is rendered, and the extent of well-being accomplished by each. If they differ in degree of worth or value for the whole, as they do, we must not confuse this with a denial of any worth at all to the lower, because it is not on the same level as the higher. Each has a moral value of its own, is a certain form of moral activity, the attainment of part of the common good. From this we see (1) that there is no moral separation of one section from another in a community (however great the distinction between class and class may be), because the good of a community is one in nature, though manifold in form. Dis-
