688 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XX. ment with its unique context, my truth is new, but as an element in an eternal reality, it was waiting for my discovery. To say that we "make truth" is not only a violation of good usage, but a one-sided emphasis on the aspect of the finite expression of truth. The relation of truth to reality is that of ideal aspect to absolute whole. Truth must always fall short of that perfect grasp of reality which it intends. In no intelligible sense can truth be said to copy reality. Rather it abstracts from reality. Any truth is good in the degree to which it has attained reality. Nothing is good in se but the absolute. This view of truth is subjectivism or relativism only in the sense that there is no truth outside of and beyond finite minds. But there is a real distinction between subjective and objective in terms of this theory.
Kant nowhere defines object or external existence. Conceived causally, the latter is to be inferred from its effects through a sort of logical deduction, or it is to be regarded as a purely regulative concept having no reality whatever corresponding to it. Notwithstanding some inconsistencies in his usage, Kant, doubtless, held that the causal category applies to the thing in itself, or objective reality. Of course we should have to ask how that which is timeless can, at the same time, be existent, and effect results in a time order. This question is met by a strange displacement: eternity is substituted for temporal change, but duration still remains. The application of the causal category to phenomena is quite as obscure as its application to noumena. Kant gives no definition of the causal concept but takes refuge behind the vague expression of a rule. Existence, in both noumenal and phenomenal forms, is supposed by Kant to be quite independent of causality. This means that causality is an hypothesis furnished by the understanding, and by no means on a par with existence. But, as the abiding elements in phenomena—atoms, material stuff, etc., are really noumenal, how can we predicate causes of our transient experiences? The answer is, only in a pragmatic way. Transitory experiences really have their causes in the things in themselves conceived through hypotheses in the legitimacy of which we believe. They are the real, unknowable truth, whereas the phenomena are the unreal, but pragmatic form of truth. Kant may, therefore, be called a pragmatist. There is a strong empirical element also to be found in him. Over against the latter, however, stands the a priori element in which is included the old concept of an innate property of the soul. This has its roots in the notion of soul faculties, the existence of which can be known only by their effects, i.e., through the application of the category of Causality. Otherwise a dualism results, in which an earth-spirit is placed over against the highest God. Objective reality or noumenon would be identical with the latter, and the world of experience would be an appearance in the consciousness of the earth-spirit. Objective reality, according to Kant, cannot be spacially extended, because everywhere and always we
