and it is interesting to observe how a philosopher approaching the subject from a stand-point very different from that of many modern students of social tendencies reaches a conception of the goal not so very remote from theirs. The difference lies in the means. For Professor Royce, the end is to be obtained not by coercion but through the development of public opinion in its best sense, not through mechanical devices but through a process of spiritual assimilation.
The doctrine of loyalty as here set forth neither invites nor demands criticism on the formal or metaphysical side. Here is a theory of the moral life: The question is, Is it a mere flapping of metaphysical wings, or can it endure the ordeal of a practical application? It is impossible to read this volume without admiration for the way in which the test has been withstood.
Yale University.
des Kantischen Moralprincips. Von Wilhelm Koppelmann. Berlin,
Reuther und Reichard, 1907.—pp. viii, 92.Within the last decade or so interest in ethics has steadily grown in Germany, and this has naturally led to a renewed study of Kant's moral philosophy. To the number of able treatises written by Hegler, Schmidt, Hagerström, Vorlander, Förster, Menzer, Adickes, and Messer, we can now add that of Koppelmann, the author of Kritik des sittlichen Bewusstseins. Owing to the significance of Kant's ethics for his world-view and the fact that many of the younger German scholars have been attracted by the ethical teachings of the great criticist, investigations such as these possess more than a historical value to students of philosophy. The present work, for example, attempts not merely to offer an interpretation and criticism of the Kantian theory, but also to develop the basal moral laws from the a priori conditions of a spiritual kingdom—the kingdom of ends, as Kant would say—which are held to be the same in all rational beings and can therefore be known with absolute certainty. In this respect Koppelmann agrees with Kant in his endeavor to deduce the moral principles from the notion of a rational being as such, or, better, from the notion of a kingdom of rational beings. He accepts as correct both Kant's method and his premises, but tries to show that Kant reaches a perfectly barren formula by exaggerating the principle of autonomy.
As the most fruitful teaching in Kant's ethics our author regards the idea—not clearly and directly expressed—that action in accordance with the principle of 'fitness for universal legislation' will result in the highest good, in the preservation of a society in which the highest is to be
