acquainted with them. Bibliographies of works best suited to the general reader who wishes to go further into the various topics are supplied. In the fields in which the present reviewer feels at all competent to express an opinion, Dr. Herbert is familiar with the standard and recent authorities, and has reported the essential points lucidly and effectively. The general reader is introduced to the important controversial issues, and made to see why they are important, without being burdened with differences of merely technical interest. It is regrettable that the chapters on Spencer and Bergson were not expanded, and also that some reference was not made to the attempt of pragmatism to introduce the evolutionary standpoint into logic. The bibliographies seem in nearly all cases to be up to date, and well chosen. However, important recent and popular writers on the psychological evolution of religion, such as Leuba, Irving King, Ames, Marett, Farnell, Durkheim, and Lévy-Bruhl, are overlooked. Reference should also have been made to other American animal psychologists besides Thorndike and Jennings, the only two mentioned.
Each book is capital in its way. Of the two, Professor Schmucker's work is probably sufficiently advanced to meet the wants of American secondary and normal school students and graduates and others of the same cultural level; while Dr. Herbert's more advanced treatment is the more suitable as a reference book for undergraduates in introductory courses in philosophy who need to know a little of science in its larger evolutionary aspects, as well as for college graduates and other reasonably cultivated readers.
Cornell University.
In this lecture Dr. Bosanquet discusses some of the fundamental positions of modern Realism, following in the main the form of that doctrine set forth by Professor Alexander. The Appendix is devoted to a brief consideration of one or two points in the volume by the six American authors entitled The New Realism.
The lecture emphasizes the fact that the modern type of Realism, in contrast with the older eclectic Materialism, groups primary and secondary qualities together as equally real, and thus gives us so far a solid or concrete reality. Even universals are transferred from the side of the mind to that of the object. The objective order thus appears as full-rounded and complete, capable of being thought as in itself self-existent. Realism cannot, however, be said to be entirely successful in transferring all the objective elements of experience to the physical side. It still feels obliged to separate what Dr. Bosanquet calls the tertiary qualities of reality—e.g., its æsthetic aspects—from the primary and secondary, and to assign them to mind. This seems to indicate a defect of the method: "It proves that in the end there is no realism
