Page:Philosophical Review Volume 26.djvu/359

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No. 3.]
SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
347

The realization of ideal values demands not only individual liberty but also individual detachment, therefore reason is to be sought in democratic, and not in collectivistic states; the over-individual state is a monstrosity, the Prussian militarism is a modern feudalism despiritualized and imbruted by a conception of the state in which there is no true reason or true humanity. Seeking a foundation for a positive estimate of true democracy according to true principles of rational liberty we note first that historically democracies have been short-lived. It is easier to act than to think, consequently democracy tends to degenerate into a mob. Plato remarked that an evil democracy was the least evil of all evil states because least efficient but he depreciated a good democracy for the same reason. But, we ask, is efficiency the measure of goodness? Law and justice are expressions of imperfection; they are definable only in terms of irreconcilable conflicts. Democracies are possible only where some strife exists; this is the secret of their instability. Does this render democratic liberty impossible? Can we maintain organization for material interests and avoid organization of ideal interests? Such an achievement is possible only on the basis of a clearer conception of law and justice. "Law, in the state, is the equivalent of self-control in the individual; justice is the equivalent of the restraint of reason and the love of truth. ... Liberty is the delicate equilibrium of life, and like all life it is a state of individual souls." Justice is a perpetual will which should be directed to rendering each his due and to defending in and for each his right. This will is possible of cultivation only in democracies, but there is a question as to whether it can be maintained, and there are indications that in the United States we are failing to do so. The only remedy is that attempted by Socrates for the Athenian democracy, the personal inspiration of personal thought.

Wm. E. Bingham.
Quietism. Rufus M. Jones. Harvard Theological Rev., X, i, pp. 1-51.

Quietism was the most intense stage of European Mysticism. There are, for Quietism, two levels in the universe. One level is 'nature,' which is godless and ruined. The other level is the supernatural. Man is depraved. Consequently, nothing divine can originate in man as man. The Quietist sought to be free from all efforts of self direction. He sought the complete 'quiet' of the 'creature,' the crucifixion of self. Then out of this state of pure repose, in which the mind thinks and desires and wills nothing, divine movings will spontaneously come. Passivity is thus only a condition of divine moving. Quietism does not mean inaction. The soul which is directed by a divine principle can accomplish wonders. Quietism, moreover, implies intense spiritual action. All the powers of consciousness are brought into complete focal unity. This state of concentration is reached by a single mighty act. When the state is once reached, the soul becomes a living center of receptivity into which God flows, and where He takes the place of the crucified self and guides the individual's actions. In this complete concentration, the mind takes no note of its own processes. Pure prayer is a unitive