Page:Philosophical Review Volume 27.djvu/279

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No. 3.]
SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.
267

the only business with which philosophy ought to concern itself.[1] As the opinion of philosophers of all ages, with very few exceptions, has differed widely from this, the claim must be regarded as a purely arbitrary one. In making it, its supporters are proposing their own definition of philosophy, a definition which is not accepted by the majority of philosophers. In addition to the critical investigation of the forms of facts, it is the further business of philosophers to provide an hypothesis which may be said to explain those facts to the satisfaction of such beings as ourselves, while remembering that, although no hypothesis can be regarded as infallible, it may be invested with a very high degree of probability, in virtue of its ability to fit the facts already known, and to furnish explanations of those new facts which are constantly forthcoming.

In applying the scientific method to the various problems of philosophy, the new realists have little or nothing to say about the subject of experience. Such brief references as are made imply that the subject, if it exists at all, is merely an inference. But, as we saw, doubt of the existence of the subject is without significance; and, moreover, although the existence of the subject may certainly be inferred—immediately inferred, indeed, from every single fact of experience—there is, in addition, the far more important central and unique fact of our experience, namely, the concrete realization of our own existence.

There are several important consequences of this ignoration of the subject. In the first place, certain problems are considered to be outside the scope of philosophy. Such, for example, are the problems of ethics. Mr. Russell says: "The difference between a good world and a bad one is a difference in the particular characteristics of the particular things that exist in these worlds. It is not a sufficiently abstract difference to come within the province of philosophy."[2] Again this limitation of the philosopher's task is a purely arbitrary one. The terms 'good' and 'bad' are only significant in a universe containing such individuals as ourselves. In their fundamental application they refer to the acts of an individual considered in relation to other individuals.

  1. But see note on p. 236 above.
  2. Op. cit., Lect. I. p. 26.