thinking which it represents. From a philosophical point of view, the interest in such works is less in the conclusions which they reach than in the categories that they employ and the assumptions upon which they proceed. Professor Veblen, as is well known, reasons with great force and clearness from his premises, and has an unusual command of epigrammatic phrases. Undoubtedly, too, in the course of his book he has said a great many true things, or things that would be true in a different context. But I venture to think that the book furnishes an excellent example of abstract and uncritical logic based upon an abstract and external view of life and experience.
I have quoted the passage from the author's preface, in which, distinguishing himself from Kant, he proposes to seek an answer to his problem "in terms of those known factors of human behavior that can be shown by analysis of experience to control the conduct of nations in conjunctures of this kind." What are these factors and what is the character of the analysis by which they are here discovered? To some extent the author appeals for support to the authority of Political Science, but he also refers in an off-hand and omniscient way to historical illustrations for confirmation, and also to his own interpretation of individual human experience and motives. I will quote a few of the sentences I have marked in reading the book. "By lineal descent the governmental establishments and the powers with which they are vested, in all the Christian nations, are derived from the feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which, in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character" (p. 9). "In all cases, there stand over in this bearing certain primary characteristics of the ancient regimen" (p. 10). "Since the ethical values involved in any given international contest are substantially of the nature of afterthought or accessory, they may safely be left on one side in any endeavor to understand or account for any given outbreak of hostilities" (p. 23). "It [the national honor] is a highly valued asset, or at least a valued possession, but it is of a metaphysical, not of a physical nature, and it is not known to serve any material or otherwise useful end apart from affording a practicable grievance consequent upon its infraction" (p. 29). "Into this cultural and technological system of the modern world the patriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings" (p. 40). In its economic, biological and cultural incidence patriotism appears to be an untoward trait of human nature; which has, of course, nothing to say as to its moral excellence, its æsthetic value, or its indispensability to a worthy life. ... Indeed, its well-known moral and æsthetic value, as well as the reprobation that is visited on any shortcomings in this respect, signify, for the purposes of the present argument , nothing more than that the patriotic animus meets the unqualified approval of men, because they are, all and several, infected with it. ... No higher praise of moral excellence, and no profounder test of loyalty, can be asked than this current unreserved commendation of a virtue that makes invariably for damage and discomfort" (p. 47). "The patriotic spirit, or the tie of nationalism, is evidently of the nature of habit, whatever proclivity to the formation of such a habit may be native to mankind" (p. 134). "The 'nation,' without the bond of dynastic
