Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/71

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THE METHOD OF IDEALIST ETHICS.
[Vol. IV.

whether or not of a thing's existence, or the how of its existence, that is, in judgments depending on a standard of Truth,—we also form judgments depending on a standard of Value. Such judgments of value fall into two classes, which may be distinguished by saying that one class relates to the value of things as determined by characteristic relations that are in no sense the product of will. These are the aesthetic judgments, depending on a standard of Beauty. The other class relates to events that are much more within our own control,—our conduct and character as conscious beings. These are the ethical judgments, depending on a standard of Right,—that is, on a meaning or purpose in our lives. These judgments of Value, in both kinds, seem to be quite distinct from the intellectual judgments referred to above, which are judgments of fact, while the others are upon fact; but we must look more closely still at their difference and connection.

It is by means of these factual judgments that individual minds attain to knowledge; that is, each recognizes or reproduces ideally (in his own consciousness) what really exists. The ideal goal of all attempts at knowledge is to attain to an understanding or comprehension of Reality as a whole,—of all kinds of existence regarded as belonging together; whereas the special sciences deal only with particular kinds of existence, regarded in separation. Thus, Physics deals with the laws and modes of matter in motion; Biology (and Physiology), with the general facts and special functions of living beings; Psychology, with the facts and functions of consciousness. Metaphysics attempts to comprehend the different kinds of existence together; it has not to 'deal with Reality as a whole' in the sense that it ignores all the results of the special sciences,[1] but in the sense that it seeks to combine these results, removing their limitations and doing justice to each.

Now this idea of a completely unified knowledge is itself a standard of Value, by which we test those attempts at scientific knowledge to which men have hitherto attained. It is an

  1. Most expositions of 'the relation of Science and Philosophy' in effect amount simply to this.