organic whole. Professor Caldwell does not, so he claims, attempt to give us an exposition "or even an exposition and criticism" of his philosopher's teaching, but desires "to connect Schopenhauer with some few broad lines of philosophical and general thought, and with some few broad principles of human nature." He endeavors "to set forth Schopenhauer's general suggestiveness and the philosophical roots of some of his leading ideas, rather than to give a critical exposition of his thought." He believes that the time has come for such an undertaking, and hopes that his work "may afford reflective matter for those who have an interest in Schopenhauer."
Professor Caldwell holds that though the study of his volume presupposes "some elementary knowledge" of Schopenhauer, it contains enough positive statement from and about him to render the contents intelligible to "the ordinary reader." I am inclined to think, however, that the writer expects a little too much of the ordinary reader. Indeed, he could hardly have chosen a more unfortunate method of treatment than the one employed by him. He attempts, not merely to interpret the teachings of the great pessimist and to criticise them, but to present a philosophy of his own. Expositions, criticisms, and original Weltanschauungen are so crowded together as to make it extremely difficult to distinguish the various elements. In his preface, Professor Caldwell asks our pardon for this fault, which seems to me to be a very serious one. "I crave indulgence," he says, "for the supreme liberty I have taken in often speaking for my author, and in often, perhaps, identifying my exposition or criticism or philosophy with his name or his principles. If I have made him speak and appear significant, that is all I care about." As a consequence of "the supreme liberty" which Professor Caldwell has taken, "the ordinary reader" and the extraordinary one, too, for that matter, will often find it hard to tell exactly whether Schopenhauer or his representative is speaking. Fairness demands that each person shall have a chance to tell his story without interference. Historians of philosophy have long ago discovered that, it will not do to interrupt the chief speaker too frequently, and to be continually endeavoring to set him right. The best way to make Schopenhauer appear insignificant is to stand by his side and prompt him all the time. Professor Caldwell will, perhaps, rejoin that he is not posing as an interpreter, or even as a critic, but as an independent thinker who is desirous of building a new system on Schopenhauerian foundations. But he could have served his purpose better, had he first given us a careful exposition of the master's doc-
