Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/463

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447
NOTES.
[Vol. VI.

genius. What is ordinarily called 'society' is the generalizing social force; and what is ordinarily called the 'individual' is the particularizing social force. Social development results from the correspondence and agreement of these two forces. Individual variations and particularizations render possible variations in the social organization, if society is able to generalize the new element which the individual variation introduces. But the individual variations do not take effect in a vague and indeterminate manner (this the author seeks to demonstrate by a special psychological and biological research); the course and direction of variation are limited by physical and social heredity, and the new element, which is produced as a variation, must itself be a particularization of earlier generalizations. In the development of society there is always—just as in the development of the individual consciousness—a continual movement between two poles.

"There is thus established an harmonious correspondence and agreement between the two social forces which are ordinarily held to be opposed to each other,—the individual and society. But, in the opinion of the author, this agreement is not always realized. Conflicts in practice and problems insoluble in theory are liable to arise from the collision of the two social forces. For there is always something in the individual which cannot be generalized, and something in society which cannot be particularized. As long as the normal social development continues, there may at any time surge up tragic conflicts, which consist in moral protests against the social order. This condition of strain between the two social forces is called by the author 'the ultimate and irreducible antinomy of society.' Between this antinomy and reciprocal action in harmony, there are many intermediate forms.

"Certainly the question proposed might be, and should be, examined from more points of view than the author has done by his large use of the psychological and genetic method. But by the original, profound, and penetrating use which he makes of this method, he has really cleared up the notions which must be used in the study of this question, and thereby made much progress toward its solution. In fact, the last parts of the memoir, in which application is made of the results obtained by this method, are extremely brief, not only in themselves, but also in comparison with the earlier parts, which constitute a very complete psychological essay. Nevertheless, the author indicates with sufficient clearness the consequences of his researches for the problem proposed. And perhaps it would be unnecessary to develop these consequences more at length, however interesting it would have been to see the author's talent as observer and as analyst employed in more extended researches in ethics and social science. Taking his work as he has presented it to us, we report that, in view of the superior qualities of which we have spoken, it is worthy to receive the prize offered.

"H. Höffing (rapporteur)
"Goos.
"K. Kroman."

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