Page:Philosophical Review Volume 6.djvu/60

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44
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. VI.

or moral in value. But the third view declares unambiguously that the sense of effort is, in any case, due to the organic reverberations of the act itself, the 'muscular,' visceral, and breathing sensations.[1]

In the following paper I purpose, for the most part, to approach this question indirectly rather than directly, my underlying conviction being that the difference between the 'sensational' and 'spiritual' schools is due to the fact that one is thinking of a distinctly psychological fact, the way in which the sense or consciousness of effort is mediated, while the other is, in reality, discussing a logical or moral problem,—the interpretation of the category of effort, the value which it has as a part of experience. To the point that the distinction between 'physical' and 'spiritual' effort is one of interpretation, of function, rather than of kind of existence, I shall return in the sequel. Meantime, I wish to present a certain amount of introspective evidence for the position that the sense of effort (as distinguished from the fact or the category) is sensationally mediated; and then to point out that if this is admitted, the real problem of the psychology of effort is only stated, not solved; this problem being to find the sensational differentia between the cases in which there is, and those in which there is not, a sense of effort.

The following material was gathered, it may be said, not with reference to the conscious examination of the case in hand, but in the course of a study of the facts of choice; this indirect origin makes it, I believe, all the more valuable. The cases not quoted are identical in kind with those quoted, there being no reports of a contrary sense. "In deciding a question that had to be settled in five minutes, I found myself turned in the chair, till I was sitting on its edge, with the left

  1. Professor James, to whom, along with Ferrier, we owe, for the most part, the express recognition of the sensational quales concerned in effort, appears to accept the second of these three types of views. I do not know that the question has been raised as to how this distinction is reconcilable with his general theory of emotion; nor yet how his ground for making it—the superiority of the spiritual over the physical is to be adjusted to his assertion (Psychology, II, p. 453), that the sensational theory of emotions does not detract from their spiritual significance.