Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/155

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139
BUTLER'S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE.
[Vol. VIII.

conduct results from the perversion and excessive indulgence of principles which are in themselves natural and right, if rationally followed. Passions like emulation and resentment, by the abuse of which men are so frequently led on to the performance of all sorts of vice, not only are in themselves good, but also have a positive function in the maintenence of the moral order of life. "Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over, others, with whom we compare ourselves."[1] This, in itself and in its proper use, is, therefore, a passion which naturally has a most beneficial function; it is right and proper that one should possess an affection which would lead him to emulate the good deeds and the moral worth of another. Only when one emulates something which is not worthy of emulation, does it become vicious and lead to evil results." To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is," Butler thinks, "the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end, which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful, envy, aims at, is exactly the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and that consequently to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."[2] Thus envy, which has its root in emulation, is simply a perversion of the natural passion, a specifically named extreme, which awaits not the approval of any higher regulative principle, asserts itself on improper occasions, pursues unworthy objects, and scruples not at the means employed. The same case is made out for resentment in the eighth Sermon. In itself it is nothing more than the natural indignation every man feels upon seeing instances of villainy and baseness. It is an inward witness bearing testimony on behalf of virtue and against wickedness.[3] Butler distinguishes two kinds of resentment, hasty or sudden, and settled or deliberate, the former of which is called anger and often passion, and the latter resentment proper.[4] Deliberate resentment is needed to balance pity and to assist just

  1. Sermons, I, Sect. II, note e, pp. 46-47.
  2. Loc. cit.
  3. Sermons, VIII, Sect. 19, p. 149.
  4. Ibid., Sect. 5, p. 138.