pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other strange monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then, when we were reverencing him as a god, he might have condescended to inform us that he was no wiser than a tadpole, and did not even aspire to be a man—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom ?"—J.
Then Socrates takes upon himself to defend Protagoras, who is made to qualify his original statement: "Man is the measure of all things, but one man's knowledge may be superior in proportion as his impressions are better; still, every impression is true and real, and a false opinion is impossible."
Common-sense, replies Socrates, is against this theory, which would reduce all minds to the same level. Practically, men are always passing judgment on the impressions of others, pronouncing them to be true or false, and acting accordingly; they recognise superior minds, and submit to teachers and rulers: thus Protagoras himself made a large fortune on the reputation of having better judgment than his neighbours. And if one man's judgment is as good as another's, who is to decide? Is the question to he settled by a plurality of votes, or what shall be the last court of appeal? Protagoras may think this or
