being able to explain the letters. Or, lastly, is explanation "the perception of difference"? For instance (says Socrates, somewhat rudely), I know and recognise Theætetus by his having a peculiar snub nose, different from mine and all other snub noses in the world. But is my perception of this difference opinion or knowledge? If the first, I have only opinion; if the second, I am assuming the very term which we are trying to define.
And thus, in the true "Socratic manner," abrupt and unsatisfactory as it seems to us, the Dialogue ends; and "knowledge" remains the same unknown quantity as before. And yet (Socrates thinks) the discussion has not been altogether fruitless; for he has shown Theætetus that the offspring of his brain were not worth the bringing up.
"If," concludes the philosopher, "you are likely to have any more embryo thoughts, such offspring will be all the better for our present investigation, and if you should prove barren, you will be less overbearing and gentler to your friends, and modest enough not to fancy you know what you do not know. So far only can my art go, and no further; for I know none of the secrets of your famous teachers, past or present."—J.
