the unjust man. He will be ever at war with himself, and so unable to act decisively. Lastly, the soul (like the ear or eye) has a work of its own to do, and virtue which enables it to do that work well. Justice is a work of the soul, and the just man lives. well and is happy; and as happiness is more profitable than misery, so is Justice more profitable than Injustice.
Thrasymachus is now in a good temper again, and readily acquiesces in all that Socrates has said; but Glaucon, shrewd and combative, takes upon himself the office of "devil's advocate" (for he admits that his own convictions are the other way), and revives the defence of Injustice from a Sophist's point of view.
"Naturally," he says, "to do injustice is a good, and to suffer it an evil: but as men found that the evil was greater than the good, they made a compact of mutual abstinence, and so justice is simply a useful compromise under certain circumstances. If you were to furnish the just and unjust man each with a ring such as Gyges wore of old, making the wearer invisible to all eyes, you would find them both following the same lawless path; for no man would be so steeled against temptation as to remain virtuous, if he were invisible. As things are, he finds honesty the best policy.
"Again, let us assume both characters—the just and unjust to be perfect in their parts, so that we may decide which is the happier of the two. Our ideal villain will reduce crime to a science—ho will have wealth, and money, and honour, and influence—all that this world esteems precious; he will have a high
