ties. In other words, if it is said to be "right" that they should carry them on, then, by permutation, we get the assertion that they "have a right" to carry them on. Clearly the conception of "natural rights" originates in recognition of the truth that if life is justifiable, there must be a justification for the performance of acts essential to its preservation; and, therefore, a justification for those liberties and claims which make these acts possible.
But being true of other creatures as of man, this is a proposition lacking ethical character. Ethical character arises only with the distinction between what the individual may do in carrying on his life-sustaining activities, and what he may not do. This distinction obviously results from the presence of his fellows. Among those who are in close proximity, or even at some distance apart, the doings of each are apt to interfere with the doings of others, and in the absence of proof that some may do what they will without limit, while others may not, mutual limitation is necessitated. The non-ethical form of the right to pursue ends, passes into the ethical form when there is recognized the difference between acts which can be performed without transgressing the limits, and others which can not be so performed.
This, which is the a priori conclusion, is the conclusion yielded a posteriori, when we study the doings of the uncivilized. In its vaguest form, mutual limitation of spheres of action, and the ideas and sentiments associated with it, are seen in the relations of groups to one another. Habitually there come to be established certain bounds to the territories within which each tribe obtains its livelihood; and these bounds when not respected are defended. Among the Wood-Veddahs, who have no political organization, the small clans have their respective portions of forest; and "these conventional allotments are always honorably recognized."[1] Of the ungoverned tribes of Tasmania, we are told that "their hunting-grounds were all determined, and trespassers were liable to attack."[2] And, manifestly, the quarrels caused among tribes by intrusions on one another's territories, tend in the long run to fix bounds and to give a certain sanction to them. As with each inhabited area, so with each inhabiting group. A death in one, rightly or wrongly ascribed to somebody in another, prompts "the sacred duty of blood-revenge"; and though retaliations are thus made chronic, some restraint is put on new aggressions. Like causes and effects were seen in those early stages of civilized societies, during which families or clans, rather than individuals, were the political units; and during which each family or clan had to maintain itself and its possessions against others such. This mutual restraint, which in the nature of things arises between small communities, similarly arises between individuals in each community; and the ideas and usages appropriate to the one are more or less appropriate to the other. Though within each group there is ever
