cause, indeed, of very few things. Among the great variety of events which happen in the course of human affairs, evil prodigiously overbalances good in everything which regards men. Of all that is good there can be no other cause than God; but some other cause ought to be discovered for evil, which should never be imputed as an effect to God.—L. ii.
VII.—Plato's doctrine of punishment, as laid down
[here], is refuted by his previous reasonings.
VIII.—THE UNCHANGEABLE NATURE OF GOD.
Do you think that God is like a vulgar conjuror, and that he is capable for the sake of effect, of assuming, at one time, one form, and at another time, another? Now, in his own character, converting his proper form into a multitude of shapes, now deceiving us, and offering vain images of himself to our imagination? Or do you think that God is single and one, and least of all things capable of departing from his permanent nature and appearance?
IX.—THE PERMANENCY OF WHAT IS EXCELLENT.
But everything, in proportion as it is excellent, either in art or nature, or in both, is least susceptible of receiving change from any external influence.
X.—AGAINST SUPERSTITIOUS TALES.
Nor should mothers terrify their children by these fables, that Gods go about in the night-time, resembling strangers, in all sorts of forms: at once blaspheming the Gods and rendering their children cowardly.
