commerce clause" of the Federal Constitution, arguing that, if it did apply to interstate passengers, which was not conceded, it would be construed to apply only to transportation within the State. Under this latter ruling apparently the colored passenger going from West Virginia to Indiana through Kentucky would have to ride in the car provided for his race in that State.
The same year, 1898, the Supreme Court[46] of Tennessee held that it was a proper exercise of the police power to require even interstate passengers to occupy separate accommodations while in that State. The last case[47] upon this point, decided April 16, 1907, held that a railroad company may, independently of statute, adopt and enforce rules requiring colored passengers, although they are interstate passengers, to occupy separate coaches or compartments.
Thus the matter stands. In the absence of a recent United States Supreme Court decision upon the point, it would be unsafe to make a generalization. But it is clear that there has been, in the point of view of the Federal judiciary, a reaction from the extreme doctrine of Hall v. DeCuir. All the lower courts, both State and Federal, are inclined to make the laws apply to all passengers, both intrastate and interstate, so long as they are within the borders of the particular State.
Sleeping Cars
In a number of the "Jim Crow" laws there are special provisions about Pullman cars. Oklahoma and Texas provides that carriers may haul sleeping or chair cars for the exclusive use of either race separately, but not jointly.
