Page:Roman History of Ammianus Marcellinus.djvu/544

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29. Therefore Theodosius, fearing to become involved in a war to which his forces were unequal, and that if he with his small force (for he had but three thousand five hundred men) should engage with an immense multitude, he should lose his whole army, at first hesitating between the shame of retreating and his wish to fight, gradually fell back a little; but presently was compelled by the overpowering mass of the barbarians to retire altogether.

30. The barbarians were exceedingly elated at this event, and pursued him with great obstinacy . . . . Being compelled by necessity to fight, he would have lost all his army and his own life, had not these tumultuous tribes, the moment they saw a troop of the Mazican auxiliaries, with a few Roman soldiers in their front, fancied that a numerous division was advancing to charge them, and in consequence taking to flight, opened to our men a way of escape which was previously shut against them.

31. Theodosius now drew off his army in safety; and when he had reached a town called Mazucanum, he found there a number of deserters, some of whom he burnt alive, and others he mutilated after the fashion of the archers whose hands had been cut off. He then proceeded towards Tipata, which he reached in the course of February.

32. There he stayed some time deliberating, like that old delayer, Fabius, on the circumstances around him, desiring to subdue the enemy, who was not only warlike, but so active as usually to keep out of bowshot, rather by manoeuvres and skill than by hazardous engagements.

33. Still he from time to time sent out envoys, skilled in the arts of persuasion, to the surrounding tribes, the Basurae, the Cautauriani, the Anastomates, the Cafaves, the Davares, and other people in their neighbourhood, trying to bring them over to our alliance, either by presents, threats, or by promises of pardon for past violence . . . . . seeking by delays and intrigues to crush an enemy who offered so stout a resistance to his attacks, just as Pompey in times past had subdued Mithridates.

34. On this account Firmus, avoiding immediate destruction, although he was strengthened by a large body of troops, abandoned the army which he had collected by a lavish expenditure of money, and as the darkness of night afforded a chance of concealment, he fled to the Caprarian mountains,