over the proconsuls of the public provinces; for the statement that he possessed maius imperium over such governors[1] can only mean that in any collision of authority the Princeps is not inferior to the proconsul. The world-wide appellate jurisdiction of the Princeps was a thing of very gradual growth, and it originated, not from any idea of his prerogative, but from the irresistible tendency of provincial governors, senatorial as well as imperial, to refer their difficulties to the highest interpreting authority in the Roman world, the Princeps and his consilium of judicial advisers. It is no wonder that the man who became the central source of law should also become the universal authority for its interpretation in detail.
When we turn to criminal jurisdiction, we find that here too there are three sources of jus. The Republic is represented by the quaestiones perpetuae with their praetors and equestrian judices, and also by the new criminal jurisdiction which has been attached to the consuls and the Senate; the Principate is represented by the jurisdiction of the Princeps and his delegates. The jurisdiction of the quaestiones, so long as it continued,[2] proceeded on the old lines. They judged except where the case, through a request of the parties accepted by a higher court, was exempted from their jurisdiction. The higher courts, which might stop their jurisdiction by accepting a case, were those of the Senate and the Princeps. Both of these were high courts of voluntary jurisdiction, and no appeal was permitted from one to the other.[3] Voluntary jurisdiction is by its nature difficult to define; but custom tended to limit the Senate's cognisance to certain classes of cases. These classes were determined either by the position of the accused or the nature of the offence. The Senate tried ordinary crimes, such as murder, adultery, incest, when they were committed by the members of the upper classes in society,[4] and there was a growing feeling, which subsequently(Dio Cass. liii. 32). Cf. Ulpian in Dig. 1, 16, 8 ["(proconsul) majus imperium in ea provincia habet omnibus post principem"] and in 1, 18, 4. It is a passive rather than an active majus imperium that is here contemplated. The whole scheme of the provincial dyarchy rested on the assumption that there should be no relations between the proconsul and the Princeps.]
- ↑ When the Senate granted the proconsulare imperium to Augustus in 23 B.C. [Greek: en tô hypêkoô to pleion tôn hekastachothi archontôn ischuein epetrepsen
- ↑ p. 368.
- ↑ Ulpian in Dig. 49, 2, 1, 2 "sciendum est appellari a senatu non posse principem, idque oratione divi Hadriani effectum." It was doubtless the original principle, confirmed and not created by Hadrian.
- ↑ Tac. Ann. iii. 14, xvi. 8; Suet. Aug. 5.
