identical verbal notes. They acknowledged in these notes that Bulgarian pretensions to Macedonia were just, and they gave Bulgaria a solemn guarantee that Macedonia would be given back to her, within the limits of the treaty of March 13, 1912, quite independently of what Serbia or Greece might think of it. They even proposed as a guarantee immediately to occupy the promised territories with the Italian army. If this proposal, instead of being made in September, had been made in March, half a year before, I am nearly sure that Bulgaria would have sided with us. But at that time there was no unity of opinion among the diplomatists of the entente as to the better solution to choose. Does not this mean that sometimes—let us be charitable—diplomatists are liable to be out of touch with the existing reality, and not quite well acquainted with things they ought to know?
Well, ladies and gentlemen, things are just now so complicated in the Balkans that I do not venture to utter any opinion as to what is to be done immediately in that region. We are now in the very process of development of new military operations which, in a few weeks, perhaps, may change the whole situation. But what I know, and what looms over momentary events so as to be seen afar, from a distance, is the conspicuous lesson given by the occurrences of the past which I have just recalled to your memory. Nothing short of extermination can change the state of national feeling, and the task of diplomatic wisdom is quite plain and simple if it does not permit itself to be guided by feelings of hatred or revenge. The settlement in the Balkans, to be durable, must be based on
