Page:S v Makwanyane and Another.djvu/83

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"The second important principle or characteristic to be borne in mind when interpreting our Constitution is a corollary of the reality of co-existence of the individual and society, and also the reality of co-existence of rights and duties of the individual on the one hand, and the collective of communitarian rights and duties of society on the other. In effect this co-existence means that the rights and duties of the individual are limited by the rights and duties of society, and vice versa."

[225]An outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the value it puts on life and human dignity. The dominant theme of the culture is that the life of another person is at least as valuable as one's own. Respect for the dignity of every person is integral to this concept. During violent conflicts and times when violent crime is rife, distraught members of society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus heinous crimes are the antithesis of ubuntu. Treatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu.

[226]We have all been affected, in some way or other, by the "strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice" of the recent past. Some communities have been ravaged much more than others. In some, there is hardly anyone who has not been a victim in some way or who has not lost a close relative in senseless violence. Some of the violence has been perpetrated through the machinery of the State, in order to ensure the perpetuation of a status quo that was fast running out of time. But all this was violence on human beings by human beings. Life became cheap, almost worthless.

[227]It was against a background of the loss of respect for human life and the inherent dignity with attaches to every person that a spontaneous call has arisen among sections of the community for a return to ubuntu. A number of references to ubuntu have already been made in various texts but largely without explanation of the concept.[1] It has however always been mentioned in the context of it being something to be desired, a commendable attribute which the nation should strive for.

[228]At first blush, it may sound odd that the issue of the right to life is being decided on the basis of persons condemned to death for killing other human beings. In this regard, it is relevant to note that there are some 400 people presently under sentence of death for acts of violence. That in itself means that there are probably an equivalent number of victims whose lives have been prematurely, violently, terminated. They died without having had any recourse to law. For them there was no "due process."

[229]That is why, during argument, a tentative proposition was made that a person who has killed another has forfeited the right to life. Although the precise implications of this suggestion were not thoroughly canvassed, this cannot be so. The test of our commitment to a culture of rights lies in our ability to respect the rights not only of the weakest, but also of the worst among us. A person does not become "fair game" to be killed at the behest of the State, because he has killed.

[230]The protection afforded by the Constitution is applicable to every person. That includes the weak, the poor and the vulnerable. It includes others as well who might appear not to need special protection; it includes criminals and all those who have placed themselves on the wrong side of the law. The


  1. See paragraphs 130 and 131 of Chaskalson P's judgment. The concept has been referred to also by Madala J, Mahomed J and Mokgoro J in their separate concurring judgments in this matter.