course with the Russians during the last five years, he has gained a clear conception of what is the real object of Russia's advance across central Asia, and he is the first to explain it in the English language. It can be summed up in the phrase of Gen. Skobeleff: "Russia does not want India, she wants the Bosphorus." It is England that maintains the Turk on the Bosphorus, and prevents Russia from taking it: hence Russia seeks a position from which she can threaten England with disaster, if she continues her opposition; and this position is on the frontier of India. To suppose that any body of Russians has ever seriously contemplated the conquest of India, is a mistake; but it is a fact, that the great mass of the Russian army firmly believes that England holds India by a feeble tenure, that a small force of Russian troops could cause an uprising in India which would overthrow the English rule, and that, when Russia possesses certain points on the Indian frontier from which it can injure the English, the latter will come to terms about the Bosphorus. These ideas first began to spread in Russia after the Crimean war, but they received a tremendous accession in consequence of the action of England in 1878. Their chief advocate was Skobeleff, who had taken part in several of the campaigns in central Asia, and was marvellously familiar with the Asiatic question in all its bearings.
In pursuing this advance to the borders of India, Russia has acted on two lines; and Mr. Marvin dwells at length upon this fact, so as to avoid the confusion which vague notions of geography have caused in England. The first line, which was followed from 1863 to 1876, was from Orenburg south-eastward across Turkestan. This movement practically ceased with the conquest of Khokand or Ferghana, and the virtual subjugation of Bokhara in 1876. It gave Russia a territory about as large as France, Germany, and Austria combined, added something to her trade, and brought her armies to the base of the lofty mountains in the eastern part of Afghanistan, and only 300 miles from the north-west provinces of India.
The second movement began in 1879. Its starting-point was the eastern shore of the Caspian (about a thousand miles south of Orenburg), where Russia had gained a foothold ten years before. It has progressed, with extraordinary rapidity, eastward through Turkmenia, or the country of the nomad Turkomen, lying between Persia and the desert on the north. It reached Merv, six hundred miles from the Caspian, in 1884; and this year it was nearing Herat, when the English took alarm, and endeavored to fix a limit by marking the boundary of Afghanistan as the line which could not be crossed except as an act of war.
These two movements have therefore attained their full development; and the object of them is accomplished, for Russia is now practically on the borders of India, ready to strike a vigorous blow whenever the moment seems propitious. She has a line of railway and steamboat all the way from St. Petersburg and Moscow to a short distance behind her advance post at Panj Deh; and she can move half a million men against Herat with far more ease and safety than she moved them into Turkey in 1877. And from Herat there are no physical obstacles to prevent a march on India; for, according to Mr. Marvin, one can drive a coach and four all the way.
This is in brief the situation of affairs to-day, as delineated with the utmost lucidity in Mr. Marvin's excellent little book. He accuses Russia of bad faith in her movements: so have France and other nations accused England in the past, until 'perfidious Albion' has come to be a by-word. Such accusations, and the arguments in support of them, count for little with disinterested spectators. What they desire to know are accomplished facts, and it is in the presentation of these that the merit of this book consists. Few people, even among those who have tried to follow this trans-Caspian movement, have realized what it has already accomplished, and how pregnant it is with great events for the near future. What was scouted in parliament only four years ago as an idle dream, is to-day a reality, an existing state of affairs. It finds the English unprepared, undecided, bewildered, as to their proper course. In front of them is a nation which they have succeeded in converting into their inveterate enemy, patient, crafty, determined, with a clear understanding of its own intentions, and a willingness to make any sacrifices in support of them. If England will agree with her about the Bosphorus, Russia will be at peace, and even retire from central Asia; if not, a terrible war must ensue, not necessarily now, but in the near future,—a war in which all the advantages of position will be on the side of Russia. The probable result of such a war is a matter of the widest speculation, and no one can foretell it. It is enough now to know and understand the existing state of affairs, and this Mr. Marvin has enabled us to do.
