and feeling, which frequently contend for victory. Are these principles powerful enough to compel nations, or even individuals, to think and act alike? Can they bind opposite characters by the ties of affection and friendship? Will morality ever be able to appease the perpetual contest between honour and duty; between private and public obligations; between imperious opinions and restricting laws; between humanity pleading for pardon, and social order demanding vindictive punishment; between that justice which examines the motives of an action, and that which considers its legality and its consequences? Can moral science create estimable qualities without their attendant failings? Has it ever formed a completely virtuous character? or has it only been able, by mewing the origin of contrarieties, to render enlightened persons equitable in their judgments and in their conduct; some few, as perfect, or rather as little imperfect, as human nature will admit? Yet, who will say that morality should be treated with distrust or neglect?
But allowing the possibility of a theory of Polite Literature, to what purpose, it may be asked, will it serve?
This question may be expected from those, who have observed many persons, possessed of a theoretic knowledge of composition, who yet were incapable of a single flight of genius, and destitute of taste; while others, though unaided by learning, by the sole guidance of nature, decide with accuracy, and even compose with elegance.
