Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/85

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Causes of Lee's Defeat at Gettysburg.
77

discussed in my article on Gettysburg in the Southern Review, April, 1868. The views therein expressed as to the motives, policy, conduct and results of that campaign, I have reason to know agreed substantially with those of General Lee. I have procured a copy of the Review, corrected the errors and missprints, and sent it to ———, through the address in Philadelphia you gave me. I will add a few notes here:

1st.———thinks it was "a mistake to invade the Northern States at all" in 1863. There were undoubted evils in such a course as———clearly states, but he leaves out of view the fact that only a "choice of evils" existed for an army greatly inferior in numbers and resources in the presence of a powerful adversary—an adversary severely checked, it is true, at Chancellorsville, but with ample means of quickly repairing his losses, with absolute command of the water, and the consequent power to penetrate Virginia in half a dozen places whenever he chose to do so. It was impossible to attack Hooker at Fredericksburg, when he was only 10 or 12 miles from his base on the water. As Lee moved northward Hooker kept his forces in front of Washington, and so near it as to offer no opportunity to his antagonist. It was only after Lee had crossed the Potomac and excited apprehension in regard to one or more of the large Northern cities that he could get the Federal army far enough away from its base, or from fortified lines, to attack it. His march diverted their campaign from a movement against Richmond to the defence of Washington, and at the same time brought him within reach of ample supplies. But suppose Lee had remained at Fredericksburg on the strict defensive. This was to lose the results of the advantages gained at Chancellorsville. It was to yield a large part of the best grain producing portions of Virginia to the enemy. In a few weeks the Federal army would have been ready to move against him. His position could be easily turned because of the Federal command of the water. It was possible for the Federal army at any time to establish itself by means of the James or York rivers within a