110 Southern Historical Society Papers.
the field at 2:30, and at once . attacked the enemy, and was soon reinforced hy Early. The Union forces were driven back with serious loss, as has been stated. Anderson's division of Hill's corps- came upon the field after the fighting had ceased. One brigade of it (Wilcox's) and a battery were placed on picket one and a quarter miles south of the Chambersburg road, near a mill on Marsh creek. Johnson's division of Ewell's corps reached the field a little before- dark; Hood and Kershaw^s divisions of Longstreet's corps during the night, and bivouacked east of Marsh creek. None of these four divisions had been engaged. All of General Lee's infantry was now up and in hand, except Pickett's division of three brigades. Of the eight divisions present, four had been fiercely engaged during the day.
General Longstreet has been charged with not attacking early the next morning as ordered. Some say he was ordered to attack at sunrise, but this he denies, and adduces, in support of his de- nial, several letters from staff officers of General Lee, in which they concur in the statement that they knew nothing of orders to him to attack at that hour. General Longstreet is of the opinion that these letters disprove the charge that he was ordered to renew the battle at sunrise; but whilst he is mistaken in this, they never- theless produce the impression that there were no such orders. General Longstreet having disposed of, as he supposes, the alleged charge of not attacking at sunrise on the morning of the 2d, goes- farther, and says that when he left General Lee on .the night of the 1st, he did so without any orders at all, and that it was 11 o'clock in the morning of the 2d when he was ordered to move around and attack the extreme left of the enemy.
There was at the time a general impression that General Long- street's attack was made too late, and had it been made earlier it would have been followed by a decided victory, and there would have been no third day's battle. And there was also a suspicion or feeling that he had been ordered to make his attack earlier than he did. Early in the morning was the time generally supposed his attack would be made. The impression that orders were given during the night for an early attack on the enemy's left is strength- ened by the statements of officers who are entitled to credit. Col- onel Taylor, the Adjutant-General with General Lee, says: "His (General Lee's) mind was evidently occupied with the idea of re- newing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn of day on the 2d. * * * * He determined to make the