prepare the army for an early offensive movement against the Federal army at Pittsburg landing. General Johnston left to you practically the functions of the immediate commander of the Confederate forces. The corps commanders severally made all their reports to you, either directly or through my office; while I, though issuing all orders which regulated the details of the service and every movement in the name of General Johnston, really received instructions thereupon from you and not from him. Thus it was when on the night of the 2d of April, 1862, General Cheatham, who commanded a division of Polk's corps, posted at Bethel station, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, some twenty-four miles northward of Corinth, reported to his corps commander that a strong Federal force, believed to be General Lew Wallace's division, was menacing his immediate front. General Polk, having at once transmitted Cheatham's telegraphic dispatch to you, it was immediately sent by you to my office with your endorsement, nearly in these very words: "Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg landing."
Written below were substantially these words: "Colonel Jordan had better take this communication to General Johnston in person.—G. T. B."
Having immediately complied with your wishes, I found General Johnston in a room with some of his personal staff, and there I handed him the dispatch. He soon thereafter repaired with me to the quarters of General Bragg, whom we found already in bed. General Bragg declared in favor of your proposition as soon as he read it, but General Johnston expressed several objections with much clearness and force, and questioned the readiness of the army for so serious an offensive movement. His view evidently shook the opinion of General Bragg, who all the time had remained in his bed. Having discussed the subject almost daily with you during the past ten days, and knowing the reasons which made you regard the immediate offensive as the true course in the exigency, I stated them with as much clearness and urgency as I could, dwelling particularly upon the fact that we were now as strong as we could reasonably hope to be at any early period, while our adversary would be gaining strength by reinforcements almost every day until he would be so strong as to be able to take the offensive with irresistible numbers. Secondly, that our adversary's position at Pittsburg landing, with his back against a deep, broad river, in a cul-de-sac formed by two creeks (Owl and Lick), would make his
