Generals Bragg and Hardee that they were unable to move their corps at the hour indicated for them, because General Polk's corps was in the way, you sent one of your staff to General Polk to inquire why he had not put his corps in motion. He replied that he was awaiting the "written order" directing him to march. You at once, through an Aid-de-Camp, directed him to clear the road and follow the movement as ordered. It was, however, already dark before his corps had finally filed out of the streets of Corinth. But for this delay, or had the movement commenced at midday on the 3d of April, as was intended and ordered, the Confederate army must have easily made the march to the immediate vicinity of the enemy by the afternoon of the 4th and made the attack, as you had planned, on the morning of the 5th of April—that is to say, twenty-four hours earlier than it was made. In that event, Buell must have reached the theatre of war entirely too late to retrieve the disaster which was inflicted on the 6th of April, and must himself have been forced to retire in haste from Middle Tennessee.
Even the next day there was inexplicable delay in the movements not only of Polk's corps but of Bragg's also, so that on the night of the 4th of April the Confederate forces were assembled no farther in advance than at and around Monterey, and did not reach the vicinity of the Tennessee river until about 2.30 P. M. on the 5th (the distance traversed to Monterey and beyond not having been more than thirteen miles). There had, indeed, been some rainfall during the march, and consequently the roads were somewhat heavy; they were narrow wheelways, moreover, traversing a densely wooded country. But all these reasons do not account for the slowness of the march, which must be ascribed in truth to the unfortunate tardiness which characterized the start, marching and movements on the 3d and 4th of April.
Without entering upon the details of the battle of the 6th and 7th of April, I will state that a reconnoissance in force, conducted on the 4th of April under the command of Colonel Wheeler, was made by that officer with such vigor, audacity and confidence that it ought to have been made plain to the Federal commander that it was the precursor of a near attack. It was your fear consequently, expressed at the time, that such would be the effect, and, therefore, that we should find our enemy behind entrenchments. I cannot now say whether or not this reconnoissance and the manner of it were due to your orders, but it is my recollection that the troops,
