Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 37.djvu/35

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Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign.
27

Second Report:

As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to join the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart with the remainder of his command would soon arrive.

These are in substance all of the statements in General Lee's two reports "in regard to his orders and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign," which Mosby says, "have been generally accepted without question," but which he does not believe General Lee is responsible for, although they appear over his signature. He thinks the advance of Longstreet and Hill on the 24th was premature and resulted disastrously; he claims that Stuart was carrying out orders of General Lee when he moved directly to Carlisle after crossing the Potomac at Seneca (probably through failure to give due weight to General Lee's letter of the 23rd); and he endeavors to show that General Hill was responsible for the miscarriage of General Lee's plans; and that the scout's report and Ewell's recall were not as stated, but if he has made any specific denial of the above statements of General Lee "in regard to his orders and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign," it has escaped my attention.

General Lee says in his first report: "No report had been received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information." Mosby says in answer to this that the cavalry, with Stuart, was not needed to obtain information of the enemy's movements, and that it was better employed elsewhere.

In his second report, General Lee says: "General Stuart was directed to hold the-mountain passes with part of his command (i. e., Robertson's and Jones' brigades), as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder (three brigades), to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer (Stuart), that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do