We may ask ourselves: How is it possible that a policy so utterly absurd, reckless, and pernicious should find any supporters among men whose sound sense and patriotism are not completely extinguished? I find the reason in a vague impression, here and there prevailing, that the Union and universal good feeling may be restored by a policy of conciliation and compromise. I find it in the generous impulses of magnanimous hearts, which insist that those who are conquered and brought to terms, should be re-attached to us by a kind and forbearing treatment. There is no man in this country who would be less inclined than I to listen to the promptings of vengeance and resentment. But while we are willing to act with a sincere desire to heal all wounds by generous accommodation, do you not see, that before we find a field for that magnanimity in offering terms to the conquered, the rebels must first be conquered and brought to terms? [Applause.] And do you not further see, that if we follow the Chicago policy, the chance is rather that the rebels will be masters of the situation and bring us to terms? Still, as the feeling I speak of is vague and indefinite, and may make itself heard independently of the Chicago platform, I will say a word on compromise in its general aspect,
A compromise with the rebellion offered on our part, would necessarily contain two conditions: first, an abandonment of some essential point determined by the national election of 1860, for that was the occasion on which the rebels seceded; and secondly, the stipulation that the rebels shall give up the struggle and return to their allegiance. Every sensible man who has his eyes open, knows that the rebels will certainly reject a compromise containing the second stipulation as long as they entertain any hope of achieving their independence. The question arises: Would it be good policy to offer the first, even by way of experiment?
