tion will be like the adjustments of the interests of various classes of stockholders and bondholders in a reorganization or like retiring the greenbacks and resuming specie payments. This is a Gordian knot which will have to be cut when the time comes in the manner which then seems best in view of all the circumstances.[1]
But it is quite possible that even the introduction of the system would scarcely call for more than passing notice. This has usually been true when monetary standards have been changed whether for good or ill. The average Filipino, or the average inhabitant of India, had no real conception of the changes which were wrought by the adoption of the "gold exchange standard," if indeed he ever heard of it. The average American in 1873 paid little attention to the demonetization of silver, or in 1879 to "resumption," once that it had been decided on in 1875. So also to-day the average American is still unaware of the recent changes in our banking and currency laws, even of the extensive substitution of Federal Reserve notes for gold certificates.
But,—to turn to the second form of the supposed obstacle,—after the start-off had once been decided upon, the subsequent operation of the system would not arouse contests. On the contrary, it would avoid them. Experience proves that the creditor and debtor classes do not get aroused when the price level is fairly stable but only after the most drastic and long continued changes.
Thus it took over two decades of falling prices after 1873 to arouse the debtor class to a realization of its losses, and then only after much agitation.
Likewise to-day it is hard to make the average man realize that the depreciation of the dollar has affected the interests of creditor and debtor. Though economists may clearly show by index numbers that the bond-holder has not really been getting any interest, i.e. has
- ↑ For my suggestions as to how to solve this part of the problem, see Appendix I, § 4.
