The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender's fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[1]
In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost
every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed
that "every step forward" had to be literally gained by the
impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments,
that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and
that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually.
(See pp. 76 and 87 supra.)
The frontal attacks made at Wörth, at the Roten Berg at Spicheren,
opposite Flavigny, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite the gravel pits of
Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870, etc.
In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of Lovtcha, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges south of Plevna, and the fight during the advance from the west and southwest against the large work of Gorni Dubniac, show how rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a few paces. "On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down again."[2]
The attacks on Railway Hill and on Hart's Hill (February 1900), on the Tugela, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes, then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching the last firing position from which the final assault could be made.[3]
