Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/160

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IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.

Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.

On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged period over an extended front. In this case the material losses suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies and consequently of his determination to fight.


At Modder River (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[1]

The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at Modder River: "All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot." In regard to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: "Meantime the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-*

  1. General Minarelli-Fitzgerald, Die Gefechte in Natal und der Kap-Kolonie, 1899.