Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/222

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was believed that troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss 7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg (loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack. The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death. The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous system,[1] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The "void of the battlefield"[2] has become especially pro-*

  1. See Spaits, Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei. After the author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote: "And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is carefully fostered." See also this author's remarks about Courage, ibid., p. 206.
  2. This complaint of the "void of the battlefield" is not new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his Vertrauten Briefen (Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the "void of the battlefield" in the fights around Metz. Bonnal, L'art nouveau en Tactique, p. 90.