is practicable but need not be done."[1] Anyone who thinks himself capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future. Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, "Help yourselves as best you can," than to encumber them with combat rules of doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future war may correct their provisions.[2]
The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind some sort of a "normal attack", which is nothing but a firm opinion of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If
- ↑ General Bronsart v. Schellendorff, I, Betrachtungen, etc. p. 42 British Drill Regulations: "Although a normal attack is apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations, the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make themselves felt through losses and failures."
- ↑ Major von Hülsen, Schema oder Selbständigkeit? (Berlin, 1906).
