Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/253

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  • ploys in force, exposes himself to grave danger. The troops should be sent into action in a deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be thrown in for the assault.

Distribution in depth and frontage are interdependent; the greater the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In every deployment for action the following question awaits solution by the troop leader: "How deep ought the formation to be and how great an extension of front is allowable." The result of the combat depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action with another part of the force in accordance with this information; and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to repulse them—something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take advantage.

Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too broad a front.