Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/255

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was repeated over and over again in the other preliminary combats of the campaign, and invariably led to the same result.[1]

The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at Magersfontain and Paardeberg may be traced to the lack of sufficient reinforcements. At Magersfontain, the four battalions of the Highland Brigade were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at Paardeberg on a front of 4000 m.


In deciding how many men are required to occupy or attack a position, the principal point to be considered is the effect of fire. The modern long range magazine rifle will, no doubt, enable us to defend a position with a smaller force than was possible in the past with the older less improved weapons. However, combats last longer nowadays, and the shock action of Frederick the Great's tactics is no longer practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and the tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole force engaged are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable conditions, certain organizations may suffer losses quite as great as those incurred in the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.[2] Instead of the sanguinary hand-to-hand fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged fire fight carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. This fire fight is frequently decided by psychological factors and without the troops suffering material losses.

"The duration of the combat under modern conditions," writes General Négrier,[3] "leads to a considerable mental exhaustion of the troops which is apparent in nervous lassi-*

  1. Consult Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei Wörth, Kunz, Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 13, p. 10, et seq.
  2. At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of 93.1%, and twelve other French regiments suffered a lose of over 50%. To be sure, the losses sustained during the retreat are included in this total. At Albuera (16th May, 1811), the 57th Regiment (British) and the Füsiller Brigade lost 70%; in four hours the army of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which originally numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained.
  3. Revue des deux mondes, June number, 1902.