The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to make it easier for battalion and regimental commanders to designate combat sections; the higher leaders reckon with regimental and brigade fronts. In war, however, the numerical strength varies constantly, and it is therefore advisable not to reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number of rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned in drill regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent of front to be covered by organizations which act as part of a larger force in an attack seeking a decision. The extent of front to be covered in other situations, under favorable or unfavorable attack conditions, requires in each case a separate estimate.
In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions of front, which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to avoid the costly frontal attack.
At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British division under Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of 12 km.; and during the attack on Pieters Hill, on February 27th, 1900, the troops under General Buller (30,000 men) extended over a front of 11 km.
At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of 17 km. (0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed 25,000 rifles, 5000 troopers, and 116 guns on a front of 32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In the engagement at Diamond Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under Lord Roberts (40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had given up all thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February 18th, 1900, the 6th Division and the Brigade of Highlanders succeeded in getting close to the enemy, but there the attack failed on account of the lack of an impetus from the rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages were greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason for this overextension lies in the fact that a numerically in-
