"When an organisation is acting as part of a larger force and has to advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective, its commander may from the outset push a strong force into action, retaining a reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks of this force is in the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in rear of the flank which may be threatened. When an organisation is acting alone, and when both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is pushed forward and a reserve is retained. . . ."
The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be held, especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions are those dictated by necessity—always to assure effective control by the leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical units.
This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which no longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.
Belgium. The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger force in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased.
Japan. The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a company is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding that of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does not exceed 1500 m. at the initial deployment.
Russia. The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective strength, and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No figures are given for the larger units.
England. While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite extreme after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the first line may employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (i. e., 90 m.), distributed as firing line, supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist either of one company or of parts of several. Entire companies are deployed only in exceptional cases, for instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult to bring up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses will be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the firing line and the supports combined. In accordance with these general principles, a battalion may deploy for attack on a front not exceeding 800 yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A brigade consisting of four battalions will thus be able to cover either a front of 1400 or one of 2100 m., depending upon the number of battalions put into the line.
Italy. Only general principles are prescribed. "Skill in judging the proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of peace by exercises on varied ground and under different situations, especially when organizations approximately at war strength are used."
