course of the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them, or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander selects a position too close to the point where the first line is engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range of vision.[1] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position, has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his subordinates.
At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned among the different members of the staff.
The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders.
The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will, however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed.
In France this is regulated by Agents de liaison. These are to keep
the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the action of
subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders. "The importance
of permanent communication between leader and subordinate increases
with the distances separating troops in action; the leader's influence
on the course of the combat can be ensured only by these agents.
- ↑ This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise of Kuropatkin. The latter led in person too much and was completely lost in the details of minor troop-leading.
