Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/276

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A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace, and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his wishes.[1]


Austria-Hungary. "Infantry telegraph detachments" are assigned to every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.[2] These detachments are charged with the duty of keeping up the visual signal and telegraph service in field and mountain warfare. The Morse alphabet is used in visual signaling and in telegraphic communication. In this the Austrian regulations differ from the German. The infantry telegraph detachment attached to an infantry division is divided into three sections, and is equipped with telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each section consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped with 24 km. of wire.

France. Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some of the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire).

England. Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment. Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals.


7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.

(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).

It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less good and often deficient, so that in

  1. Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army with the deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. Kunz, Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience of the commander-in-chief was natural perhaps, but, due to his interference, the enveloping movement skillfully initiated by General v. d. Tann, could not be executed.
  2. Streffleur, 1905, April-May number.